U.S. ARMS CONTROL POLICY: CONGRESSIONAL CONSTRAINT OR MIC BUSINESS AS USUAL? by O'Keefe, Michael F.
u.s. ARMS CONTROL POLICY: CONGRESSIONAL
CONSTRAINT OR MIC BUSINESS AS USUAL?
Michael O'Keefe
University ofKansas
Mid-American Review of Sociology 1978, Vol. 3,No.1:63-82
This paper entertains the possibility that a military-industrial
complex does in fact exist; that it is not constrained by Congress;
that arms policy continues to serve this complex; and that in fact,
Congress legitimates MIC activity through ritualistic conflict.
Laurance's hypothesis that Congress has recently taken a more
active role in the policy process is challenged. Using Yarmolinsky's
broader conception ofarms policy, it is argued that arms policy has
not significantly changed even though Congressional action has
become more conflictual. Finally, it is argued that the changed
Congressional role is best understood in terms ofEdelman's reversal
ofsystems theory.
During the past fifteen years, critics of u.s. arms policy have
pointed to a "military-industrial complex" (MIC) as being at the
root of that policy. The ultimate power in making arms policy has
been limited to influence from the following: corporate elites
(Horwitz, 1970; Williams, 1970; Perlo, 1963; and Kolko, 1970);
the military establishment (Barnet, 1969; Lens, 1970; Heilbroner,
1970); or, managerial elites (Melman, 1970, 1"974; Barnet, 1971).
Motivation has included profit, expansion of bureaucratic control
and power. Whatever the particular configuration, the underlying
current has been that u.s. arms policy has been ultimately made
by non-elected officials in pursuit of their self-interest, and the
result has been expanded arms production.
These theorists have not been without critics, however. One
of the more telling arguments has focused upon the Congressional
role in the appropriations process. With ultimate control over
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expenditures for arms production, the Congress is theoreti.cally a
constraining force upon a military industrial complex. Spanier and
Ulsamer (1974) argue in support of Cohen's (1973) hypothesis
that economic interest groups have an impact upon defense policy,
but only within the constraints set by pre-established political
policies based upon national security needs. Russet (1969) was
unable to discover empirical relationships between Congressional
roll call voting on defense issues and defense contractor influence.
Kantor (1972:142) argues most strongly that:
The widely-held notion that an uncritical Congress passively grants
whatever appropriations are requested by the President and the
Pentagon does not do justice to the reality of the pattern of the
Congressional changes in th~ defense budget, nor does it illuminate
the past and potential Congressional role in influencing the content
of foreign policy.
A more recent entre (Laurance, 1976) has attempted to
empirically demonstrate that in recent years, the Congress has
increased its constraining role upon the defense bureaucracy. Since
the Congressional "rubber stamp" role is vital to the arguments of
MIC theorists, it appears that Laurance's findings seriously
challenge the MIC thesis.
The purpose of this paper is to entertain the possibility that a
military-industrial complex as conceptualized by Melman (1974)
does in fact exist; that it is not constrained by Congress; that arms
policy continues to serve this complex; and that in fact, Congress
legitimizes MIC activity through ritualistic conflict. Laurance's
(1976) hypothesis that the Congress has taken a m.ore active role
in the pdlicY'process since 1969 will be analyzed to demonstrate
that it rests upon a narrow conception of arms policy. Using a
broader conception of arms policy developed by Yarmolinsky
(1972), it will be demonstrated that arms policy has not
significantly changed even though Congressional action has
become more conflictual. Finally, it will be argued that the
changed Congressional role is best understood in terms of
Edelman's (1974) reversal of systems theory .
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PERMANENT WAR ECONOMY
Lieberson (1972:56) has argued that the existence of a
military-industrial complex is beyond question:
There is little reason to doubt that a "military-industrial complex"
exists if by this phrase is meant a set of commonly shared interests
between the military and some major corporations. Certain striking
features · · · are: The interchange of personnel between the military
and their corporate suppliers, the network that exists within the
business sector, and the role of large corporations as suppliers to
the military. 1
The "complex" is generally considered to include the
administr~tive decisiom~akers within the defense bureaucracy
whose pnmary concern IS defense policy, and that portion of the
indu.strial sect?r for whom arms manufacture is an important
pornon of .thell" enterprise. The dominant force in this complex,
however, IS the defense bureaucracy. Yarmolinsky (1972)
observed that the ability of a contractor to obtain a defense
budget "add-on" was dependent upon Pentagon approval. It is the
power of the defense bureaucracy and its attendent consequences
for the economy that is the focus of Melman's (1974,1976)
work.F
Melman's thesis is that bureaucratic power, located within
the defense establishment, is achieving increasing control over
large parts of the economic and political institutions in the United
States through its monopoly on contracting and information. The
result is a permanent. war economy managed by this bureaucracy,
not to be confused WIth a "mixed economy" (1974:22):
The war economy of the United States is no mere extension of
private capitalism. Neither is it an undifferentiated state capitalist
economy. · · state capitalism has been given the particular form of a
war economy. With a duration extending for thirty years, and solid
plans for more to come it is no editorial excess to understand it as a
permanent war economy.
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Not only has defense manufacture penetrated the economic
structure itself, but the methods of contracting have changed
traditional concepts of incentives, inventiveness, risk, and profit
which in turn are creating a stagnant economic growth structure.
The industrial segment is served best by receipt of contract awards
with a higher profit-to-risk ratio than is possible in non-defense
sectors of industry (Perla, 1963; Magdoff, 1969; Kaufman, 1970;
Stevenson, 1973). Stevenson has demonstrated that for the
1961-1969 period, arms contracting is at least as lucrative as other
en terprises in the industrial sector, as is indicated in Table 1. With
the. promise of risk-free or low-risk profit for industry and threats
of dire consequences resulting from decreased arms manufacture
for the economy, the defense bureaucracy has been able to amass
unrivaled power.
Melman's notion of bureaucratic power is consistent with
those of other organization theorists (Downs, 1966; Thompson,
1967; Wamsley and Zald, 1973) who argue that a viable
organization seeks to stablize its environment (Thompson) or
external political economy (Wamsley and Zald). The successful
organization appears to be the one that makes itself the center of
dependency relationships. Melman argues that the defense
bureaucracy has accomplished just that.
Critical to Melman's thesis is a "rubber-stamp" Congress
supportive of executive branch arms policy, for ultimately, the
policies of the defense bureaucracy are formally subject to
Congressional review. Wamsley' captured a great deal of the
literature supportive of the "rubber stamp" notion with his
conceptualization of an "iron triangle" of bureaucratic agencies,
Congressional committees, and special interests that function to
make public policy. However, as noted above, there is also a great
deal of literature which asserts that the Congress is in fact a
constraining force.
CONGRESSIONAL CONSTRAINT
Laurance (1976) divides Congressional activity on defense
policy into two periods. During the 1947-1967 period, the
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TABLE 1
Average profit rate of defense industries by
year (1961-1969) compared with other industries
1969 1968 1967 1966 1965 1964 1963 1962 1961
Top 24 Military
Contractors 9.9 13.1 13.7 14.9 14.8 13.6 13.0 13.7 10.3
Top 50% of all
Military
Contractors 9.8 13.0 13.4 14.9 14.7 13.5 12.8 13.4 10.2
7 Military-Industrial
Complex Giants* 7.7 12.9 11.9 17.8 18.6 15.5 16.0 16.7 10.9
Top 500 Industrial
Corporations 11.3 11.7 11.3 12.7 11.8 10.5 9.9 8.9 8.3
SOURCE: Paul Stevenson, ''The Military-Industrial Complex: An Examination of the
Nature of Corporate Capitalism in America," Journal of Political and Military
Sociology. 1:2 (1973) p. 252.
(*General Dynamics, Lockheed, United Aircraft, McDonnel Douglas, Boeing, North
American Rockwell, Grurnrnan.)
67
FIGURE 1: U.S. Procurement Budget Category Outlays, 1960-1975 (in billion~ of 1967
dollars). Broken line indicates a three year moving average trend hne.
SOU RC E: Statistical Abstracts.
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Congress did in fact act as a "rubber stamp":
(1) The Congress processed only "structural" (Huntington, 1961)
as opposed to strategic issues;
(2) when Congress acted upon strategic issues, it was mainly
concerned with domestic impact;
(3) Congress acted as a conduit for executive programs in the
defense area, as compared with their actions on other policy
areas; and
(4) when it acted on defense programs, it was generally to support
increases in executive branch programs.
(1) A decreased number of defense issues which functionally
bypass the Congress.
(2) Conflict within the Congress and between the Congress and
th~ executive branch over budgets.
(4 ) Increased alternative and mass public pressure to decrease
defense spending.
(5) Significant internal dissent in the Senate Armed Forces
Committee.
(6) Increased floor debate and amendments in Senate
authorization legislation.
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The reasons given by Laurance were the organization of Congress,
executive branch monopoly of intelligence and technology
information, and general public support for executive defense
programs. For this period, then, Laurance's findings are supportive
of Melman's thesis.
However, Laurance argues that important changes in the
nature of the Congressional defense decision-making process began
to occur in 1967 and 1968, such that the Congressional role
during the 1968-1974 period would be significantly different. The
following changes are noted:
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These changes resulted in policy 'outputs different from those
of the earlier period. Figure 1 graphically presents the changed
trend in outlays for the "Procurement" category of the defense
budget.
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A model of Laurance's proposition that changes in Congress'
external environment have produced internal change, in turn
leading to different policy, can be roughly approximated using
analysis of variance. If the outputs are in fact changed, then we
should expect these outputs from the later period to constitute a
statistically different population from those of the earlier period.
Tables 2, 3, and 4 demonstrate that this is in fact the case for
"Procurement," "Research, Development, Testing and
Evaluation," (RDT&E), and "Procurement plus RDTE"
expenditures-the categories of the defense budget most applicable
for arms policy. The time periods were lagged to allow for the
translation of policy decisions into actual outlays.f
Laurance's findings appear initially to challenge the "rubber
stamp" Congress hypothesis which is vital to MIC theory. This can
only be the case, however, if one uses a narrow conception of arms
policy. Melman's thesis is that the economy is based upon war
production-not that the government funds war production. By
reconceptualizing arms policy, it can be demonstrated that while
Congressional activity has changed, arms policy has not.
ARMS POLICY
Following Yarrnolinsky (1972), arms control policy should
be differentiated from national security policy as but one of its
subconcepts (see Figure 2)'. Foreign policy (often called national
security policy) involves the "selection of national goals in the
world, some of which the national may seek to achieve in whole or
in part, by military means" (Yarrnolinsky, 1972:280).
Arms control policy itself can be further divided into two
subconcepts: 1) procedural policy which involves "the choice of
military means to be available as instruments of foreign policy in
the event that,they are needed"; and, 2) substantive policy which
involves "the advance determination as to which military means
will be employed" (pp. 280-281, 283). Thus, procedural arms
policy is concerned primarily with the deployment of military
means, while substantive policy is concerned with the size and
scope of the force structure, which includes weapons systems.
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TABLE 2
Analysis of variance between Laurance's time periods (lagged)
a~d procurement expenditures (1967$)
Source D.F. Sum of Squares Mean Squares F Ratio F Prob.
Between Groups 64.3902 64.3902 5.669 >.050
Within Groups 13 147.6636 11.3587
Total 14 212.0538
Group Mean Standard Deviation
1960-1969 17.4047 3.2780
1970-1975 13.1755 3.5129
Total 15.7130 3.8919
TABLE 3
Analysis of variance between Laurance's two time periods
(lagged) and ROTE expenditures (1967$)
Source D.F. Sum of Squares Mean Squares F Ratio F Prob.
Between Groups 3.8666 3.8666 34.020 >0.001
Within Groups 13 1.4775 0.1137
Total- 14 5.3441
Mean Standard Deviation
1960-1969 7.0169 0.3570
1970-1975 5.9806 0.3027
Total 15 6.6024 0.6178
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TABLE 4
Analysis of variance between Laurance's two time periods (lagged)
and Procurement plus ROTE expenditures (1967$)
Source D.F. Sum of Squares Mean Squares F Ratio F Probe
Between Groups 99.8141 99.8141 7.831 >.010
Within Groups 13 165.6906 12.7454
Total 14 265.5047
Mean Standard Deviation
1960-1969 24.4216 3.4624
1970-1975 19.1561 3.7359
Total .15 22.3154 4.3548
Arms policy, then, would include the placement of u.s.
weapons in the hands of foreign governments, whether by sale or
by "gift." The sale of technologically advance weapons systems to
Middle Eastern states, for example, may serve to further u.s.
policy goals of maintaining stability in the area, increasing Arab
dependence upon u.s. as opposed to U.S.S.R. weapons supply and
working toward a solution to an unfavorable balance-of-payments
problem. Laurance's exclusive focus on defense budgetary outputs
as an indication of the Congressional role in the arms control
policy will not yield appropriate results if that policy is based
upon other means of implementation than DoD purchase. Arms
policy must be assessed in terms of all policy measures aimed at
the dispersion of weapons systems to both U.S. forces and foreign
governments.
CHANGES IN IMPLEMENTATION
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In Anns Controls Today (1976:1), Edward Luck has
presented evidence that arms policy is not implemented solely, or
even primarily,by DoD purchase.
The pace of u.s. arms transfers has more than doubled over the last
ten years, while the principal means of financing has shifted from
aid to sales, which now constitutes more than 95 percent of the
total. Foreign orders for arms sales through u.s. government and
commercial channels, under $1.5 billion in FY 70, are expected to
exceed $10 billion in FY 1976 for the third fiscal year in
succession.
Figure 3, demonstrates an escalating trend in arms exports for the
1961-1975 time period. The values plotted represent actual
exports as opposed to contracts, for all categories: government to
government sales, government to government transfers, and
commercial sales.
In fact, it can be demonstrated that just as budget outputs
form to statistically different populations, arms exports follow the
same pattern. As Table 5 indicates, the mean value of the second
'period is substantially higher than that of the earlier period-even
Other (trade policy
for example)
Procedural
I
Foreign Military
Sales
Commercial Sales
U.S. Deployment
of Weapons
Foreign Policy
/ ~
Arms Control Pol icy
/ \
RDT& E
Procu rement
Substantive
FIGURE 2: Typology of Arms Control Policy.
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SYSTEMS VS SYMBOLIC POLITICS
controlling for inflation (the values were converted to 1967
constant dollars).5
To recapitulate thus far, Laurance has argued that in response
to changes in its external environment the Congress has adopted a
conflictual role regarding requests from the executive bureaucracy.
However, any implications for arms policy, and hence Melman's
thesis, rest heavily on a narrow conception of arms policy. When
a broader, but more realistic conceptualization of arms policy
defined by Yarmolinsky is applied, it is evident that the period of
increased constraint upon defense budgets mirrors a period of
increased arms sales.
What has not been demonstrated, of course, is that the two
events-decreased DoD expenditures and increased arms transfers
through sales-are related. To do so would demand sophisticated
techniques for correlating time series data with sufficient controls
to insure that both phenomena are not a result of other variables.
Indeed, the balance of payments is often cited by u.s. government
officials as the reason for increased sales.f The ability to carry out
these statistical manipulations is hindered by the complexity of
the export data. One must be able to separate the various
categories-DoD sales, foreign military sales, military assistance
program transfers-to attain the quality of measurement and to
meet the assumptions regarding error required by the necessary
statistical operations. Since the purpose of this paper was to focus
upon the possibility of merit in Melman's thesis, these operations
are considered as being outside its scope. The problem can be
addressed theoretically, however.
For Laurance's findings to seriously question Melman's
thesis, they would have to demonstrate changes in output, rather
than changes in process. It appears that his analysis rests too
heavily upon systems theory and its assumptions that changes in
the political environment produce changes in policy. That is,
given increased demands for decreased defense spending, the
Congress reacts to these demands by decreasing the defense
budget, which in turn implies increased Congressional presence in
····1
1975
35.306 >0.001
F Ratio F Probe
0.9954
0.5254
0.4568
0.8484
0.3606
7.3658
0.2086
Mean Squares
1968 1969 1970
Mean Standard Deviation
2.3244
1.6689
3.0735
2.7121
7.3658
10.0779
Sum of Squares
1965
14
13
Fixed Effects Model
Random Effects Model
1969-1975
Total 15
1961-1968
D.F.
TABLE 5
Analysis of variance between Laurence's time periods (lagged)
and the value of arms exports (1967$)
1960
OL-L ..L.- ..L-_..L.----L. ---'
FIGURE 3: Value of U.S. arms exports (in 1967 current dollars), 1961-1975.
Broken line indicates a 3-year average trend line.
SOURCE: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
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Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
4.0
Source
3.0
2.0
1.0
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TABLE 6
Value of contracts to Lockheed for military purchases
by toreign governments for 1975
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the arms policy making. The linkage between policy and process is
assumed. Davis and Dolbeare (1968), Edelman (1964, 1971), and
Dolbeare and Edelman (1971, 1977) have demonstrated that the
assumption of systems is untenable for public policy analysis.
An alternate framework proposed by Edelman locates initial
focus on policy outcomes. He argues that conflict over policy is
often of a "ritualistic" nature. "Public controversy over an issue
functions to help participants in the debate accept an outcome
that deviates from their beliefs about the optimum policy"
(Edelman, 1971:45). From this perspective, Congressional activity
expressing concern over arms policy as reflected by the defense
budget may serve to ease the transition to an alternate, less visible
means of maintaining current arms policy. If one begins with the
notion of political conflict as a means to manipulate public
quiescience in circumstances surrounded by ambiguity, one would
argue, as does Melman, that arms policy has remained unchanged.
The oil crisis, unemployment, and balance-of-payments become
justificatory symbols, not reasons, for current arms policy. It
should be noted that while Congress had the legal powers to
prevent military equipment transfers over $25 million since 1974
and government sales over $7 million since 1976, such action
required a concurrent resolution by both parts of the Congress-an
extremely unlikely probability demonstrated by the fact that it
has yet to occur.7 The increased Congressional activity noted by
Laurance and the accompanying cuts in defense budgets point to
changes in implementation of policy, not to changes in the policy
itself.
The logic for current arms policy appears best set forth by
the u.s. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in its 15th
Annual Report (1976:44): .
There are also domestic economic benefits derived from u.s.
exports of conventional arms. In some cases the increased
production for export reduced the unit cost of weapons supplied to
u.s. forces, contribute to unemployment of manpower and capital
in defense industries, and helps keep critical production lines open.
More broadly, arms exports contribute to a favorable u.s.balance
of payments position and may help open foreign markets for u.s.
civilian exports.
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Receiver Govt.
Austrialia
Canada
Federal Republic of Germany
Greece
Netherlands
Republic of Korea
Total
Total U.S. Contracts
SOURCE: Wall Street Journal Index, 1975.
Contract Value (Millions of
U.S. dollars)
140.0
950.0
317.7
120.0
82.5
2.0
1612.2
943.0
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3. Gary L. Wamsley, lectures in Political Science 833, Fall Semester, 1976,
Kansas University.
7. Survey of Congressional Quarterly Almanacs 1970-1975, and
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports, 1976.
5. Note that there is a one year difference in time periods shown in Table 5
from those used by Laurance. This difference is required to make the
periods equivalent since the 1969 budget, for example, is made during
1968.
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Table 6 lists the economic benefits which accrued to Lockheed in
1975 through current arms policy. It appears, at least in
Lockheed's case, that the industrial sector has suffered little
adverse effect from changes in arms policy implementation or the
"new role of Congress."
CONCLUSION
NOTES
1. It should be noted that Lieberson argues that a number of similar
"other-industrial complexes" also exist in other government activities
characterized by high annual expenditures (education, for example).
The effects of this policy will remain a subject of great
debate-as will indeed the likelihood of the existence of a
military-industrial complex. For those MIC theorists who have
argued that defense policy is at the cost of meeting social needs,
the usual procedure of correlating defense expenditures and social
expenditures~ no longer work. As Laurance correctly observed,
defense budgets have declined (as social welfare expenditures have
claimed a greater part of the federal budget). For the critics that
argue that the MIC operates only within the national security
parameters set by the Congress, strong evidence to the contrary is
not available. For MIC theorists operating at the level of Melman,
however, this critique is irrelevant. If Melman's thesis of a state
managed economy is correct, the Congress is as much subject to
the defense bureaucracy as the rest of us.
I make no claims to resolving the issue in this paper. Its sale
purpose-one that I feel was achieved-was to keep the question
open in light of Laurance's findings. I have attempted to
demonstrate the examination of the issue, where arms control
policy is concerned, requires a conceptualization capable of
containing the various manifestations of that policy. I have also
attempted to show that the symbolic politics framework is
'extremely useful for describing changes in. those .. manifestations.
At best,then, this paper can be considered as a call for research.
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Dear Editor:
Please consider the enclosed paper, "On the Relationship
between Dummy Variable Regression and Multiple Classification
Analysis," for publication in your journal.
A note on its genesis is in order. The paper was written for
the benefit of my colleagues at the Center for the Study of
American Pluralism who on occasion have used these two methods
in the past. The paper was very well received and one of our staff
gave me a notice concerning your publication, suggesting that the
paper might be of general interest to graduate students in the
social sciences. Since the paper was written emphasizing the
functional relationship between the two methods, I agreed that
this was indeed the best audience for the discussion and example
presented.
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predictive models which employ a metric predicted variable and
categorical (nonmetric) predictors. The method designed to handle
this problem most often discussed in elementary statistics texts is
analysis of variance (ANOVA). ANOVA however is actually a
generic term for a number of estimation strategies employing
categorical predictors. The type of ANOVA discussed in a
beginning statistics text is only the simplest of these and is
applicable only under very restrictive conditions. The more
complex forms of ANOVA are less restrictive in their assumptions,
but suffer the drawback of being inferential only. That is, they
'. test statistical significance (the F-test) and estimate the variance
explained in the predicted variable, but do not estimate the
pattern or size of the effects of the predictors. Since pattern and
size of effect are just as important as statistical significance,
ANOVA alone often falls short of a researcher's goals.
Two methods of solving this last problem of estimating the
effects of categorical predictors, as well as their statistical
significance, are dummy variable regression (DVR) and multiple
classification analysis (MeA). The former is a special case of
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